ABSTRACT Interest in issues related to auditor judgment by parties outside the profession has shown a substantial increase since the events that led to the passage of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act in the United States. Changes in the regulation of the activities of auditors of public companies in the United States have placed an increasing emphasis on the role of professional standards and of inspections in monitoring and infl uencing auditor judgment. There is a fundamentally important difference in judgments made by auditors in forming and expressing audit opinions and those made by third parties in evaluating the effectiveness of these judgments after release of the auditor ' s report. This difference should be recognized by users of fi nancial statements and regulators. Audit judgments are unique to each individual audit and comparing audit judgment across audits presents signifi cant challenges that should be addressed carefully to avoid unintended consequences. In recent history, changes in accounting principles have increased the inherent variability of fi nancial statement amounts and, correspondingly, have increased the importance of disclosures. Although the primary focus of good auditor judgments and audit quality is at the engagement level, the current regulatory environment and the structure and business model of audit fi rms are of increased importance in infl uencing those judgments. These factors also infl uence the independence and professional skepticism of auditors.
INTRODUCTION
The infl uence of regulation and audit fi rm structure, policies and business models on auditor judgment is increasingly important in understanding and improving the appropriate exercise of judgment in the performance of audits of fi nancial statements. In this article, I hope to identify issues related to these infl uences that warrant additional research and consideration. I will use the term ' auditor judgment ' to describe any decision or evaluation made by an auditor, which infl uences or governs the process
Original Article
A discussion of auditor judgment as the critical component in audit quality -A practitioner ' s perspective and outcome of an audit of fi nancial statements. The focus of this article is on judgments that could reasonably vary between competent auditors using the same facts. The term ' audit quality ' refers to the degree to which an audit provides a basis for belief that fi nancial statements do not contain material misstatements after the completion of the audit. The quality of auditor judgments directly determines audit quality.
Current discussions of auditor judgment, audit quality and professional skepticism are heavily oriented toward judgments made at the individual audit engagement level. The emphasis of professional standards and of oversight activities has historically been on judgments made by the audit engagement team. Decisions that must, ultimately, be made in the context of a specifi c audit include:
The assessment of the risks of material misstatements of fi nancial statements, including the potential effects of fraud, bias and business risk. The identifi cation, performance and assessment of audit procedures to address those risks. The evaluation of audit evidence to determine the quality and meaning of that evidence and to assess the need for additional evidence based on the process. The formation of an opinion on the fi nancial statements and the decision whether or not to express that opinion.
Each of these judgments must be made by auditors throughout the audit process and before the date on which an audit opinion is issued, based on evidence that is reasonably available at that time. Ultimately, the auditor ' s opinion is based on informed judgments and not on conclusive evidence.
My comments are based on my earlier experience as an audit engagement partner supervising audits of both large and smaller public and non-public entities, a member of audit committees of public companies, a Although the focus of this article is on audits of US public companies, many of the issues discussed are relevant to all audits and may have application to other regulatory environments.
Why the recent concern over auditor judgment? -Although judgment has always been a critical component of both the preparation of fi nancial statements and of audits of those fi nancial statements, the most recent expressions of concern regarding auditor judgment seem to have been a product of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the events that led to its passage. Specifi cally:
The failure of Arthur Andersen, the increase in regulatory scrutiny and penalties resulting from SOX, and the major increase in class action lawsuits signifi cantly increased the level of risk aversion exhibited by audit fi rms. The risk that the work of auditors of public companies would be inspected and evaluated after the completion of audits (detection risk) was increased by the creation of the PCAOB. The duty of the PCAOB to inspect registered audit fi rms on a routine basis created immediate concern as to the likelihood that audits would be reviewed and found deficient. In particular, auditors have been critical of the use of ' hindsight ' in evaluating audit judgments whereas regulators have expressed concerns that ' professional judgment ' is inappropriately asserted as a universal defense by auditors when the basis for those judgments is not evident. In a manner not seen before, auditing standards and the policies of the PCAOB became politicized through a combination of events.
Public companies became concerned as to the potential indirect effect of PCAOB inspections on their previously issued In addition, there has been substantial criticism that the PCAOB ' s form of public reporting on inspections does not provide useful information on the quality of audits performed by the specifi c fi rms inspected to the public. This led to recommendations by the TCAP that the PCAOB °°°°d evelop and consider releasing measures of audit quality. More recently, in 2008, the Financial Reporting Council in the United Kingdom published an audit quality framework that includes discussion about means of measuring audit quality. In addition, the PCAOB ' s emphasis on the linkage of incentives to audit quality increased the desire to measure audit quality.
In more recent times, other issues have emerged to increase the emphasis on auditor judgment. Specifi cally:
The dialogue over the form and content of accounting principles in the future has lead to a general notion that accounting principles will be more ' principles-based ' than in the past. The PCAOB has expressed concern over how auditors will address the effects of additional ' discretion ' in accounting principles. Accounting principles have moved toward greater use of estimates of the outcome of future events. Further, these estimates relate to events that are more inherently uncertain and require use of probability concepts in their application.
Finally, recent research indicates that investors may not be convinced that an audit provides the information that they need to make decisions. These criticisms include assertions that:
The standard auditor ' s report does not, but should, provide information regarding the critical judgments used by the auditor in developing and supporting the audit opinion. The audited fi nancial statements do not contain information about the critical estimates and other judgments made in preparing the fi nancial statements. Although this could be dismissed as an accounting, rather than audit, issue, it could refl ect a view that auditors are not requiring disclosures that might, arguably, be required by the current US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) model.
The information provided by the auditor does not include information on the governance and controls of the company being reported on.
The necessity for preparers and auditors to exercise professional judgment is, if anything, even more important in light of these conditions. Despite the rumors, professional judgments remain the most essential element of the preparation and auditing of fi nancial statements.
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE REGULATION OF AUDITORS OF US PUBLIC COMPANIES
The passage of SOX in 2002 fundamentally changed the regulation of auditors of public companies in the United States, primarily through the establishment of the PCAOB. These changes and the indirect effect of heightened concern over auditor liability have also had substantial effects on the manner in which audits of public companies are performed.
The powers of the PCAOB
The PCAOB has the duty to register, inspect and discipline all fi rms that audit US public companies. The board itself is designed to be independent of the profession and to give substantial weight to the interests of shareholders and the public. This combination of power is substantially more rigorous than the former model of self-regulation by the profession combined with oversight by the activities of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (principally through the SEC ' s enforcement activities) that had existed from the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The PCAOB operates under the direct oversight of the SEC. This oversight includes approval of audit standards.
Inspections of registered audit fi rms
SOX requires the PCAOB to conduct annual or tri-annual (for fi rms with less than 100 public • clients) inspections of fi rms that are registered with the PCAOB. These inspections include reviews of audit work papers for selected audits and other procedures intended to assess the quality controls in place at the audit fi rm. SOX provides that quality control defi ciencies identifi ed in inspections, if corrected within 12 months of the issuance of an inspection report, not be made public. This provision of the law has created a powerful incentive for audit fi rms to take whatever steps are necessary to obtain the PCAOB ' s agreement that the identifi ed defi ciencies have been corrected.
Form of reporting of inspection results
By law, the results of the inspections cannot be disclosed by the PCAOB. As a result, the reports of the results of inspections are carefully constructed to prevent the identifi cation of specifi c registrants or the nature of the quality control defi ciencies that require remediation.
Establishment of auditing standards
SOX authorized the PCAOB to designate an independent body to develop auditing standards and related professional practice standards for the performance of audits of public companies. The Board elected to designate itself as that the standard-setter and established the Offi ce of the Chief Auditor to assist in that process. The Board established a Standing Advisory Board (SAG) that meets on regular basis to discuss matters related to auditing standards. The SAG comprises members from a variety of constituencies (investors, public interest representatives, regulators, auditors and analysts) with a minority of audit professionals. The PCAOB initially adopted the AICPA ' s auditing standards, as they existed in 2003, as their interim standards. Subsequently, the Board has issued additional standards that supersede certain components of the interim standards. Some of these standards have had a substantial impact on the conduct of audits.
The board ' recalibrated ' the interim standards by issuing its Rule 3101 that defi ned the meaning of certain terms used in the interim auditing and related professional practice standards. This rule specifi cally increased the number of situations in which audit procedures are required. In addition, Auditing Standard 3 provided substantially more rigorous requirements for audit documentation. The combined effect of these actions was to increase the emphasis on documentation as a primary means of demonstrating compliance with professional standards. Section 404 of SOX requires that public companies provide an opinion on the effectiveness of their controls over fi nancial reporting and that the auditor of the fi nancial statements provide an opinion on the effectiveness of those controls as of the balance sheet date. To implement this requirement, the board adopted Auditing Standard 2. The Board recently issued Auditing Standard 7, which will substantially increase the effort involved in the engagement of quality reviews.
The auditing standards issued by the PCAOB have been notably more rules oriented, in contrast to the standards issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board.
Pressure to measure audit quality
Although the structure of SOX was clearly intended to allow the PCAOB to regulate the quality of audits without specifi cally reporting to the public, it has been criticized from the beginning for not reporting on the quality of individual registered audit fi rms. As a result, the TCAP specifi cally recommended that the board develop means of measuring audit quality and also consider making those measurements available to the public. This pressure has substantially raised the level of discussion regarding measurements of audit quality.
•
EVALUATING AUDITOR JUDGMENT AFTER ISSUANCE OF AN AUDIT OPINION
Judgments and judgment processes are improved when the outcome of earlier judgments is known accurately and in a timely manner. Judgments made, for example, in medicine, law or weather forecasting can be improved by the analysis of subsequent events that either confi rm or disprove these judgments.
Unfortunately, the outcome of many audit judgments is never known or becomes known or suggested only because of subsequent discovery, by a preparer, of errors in previously issued fi nancial statements or as a result of reviews of audits performed by inspectors, regulators, litigators or successor auditors. Even when these situations are identifi ed, the information that can be derived is limited and often biased.
The specifi c situations in which reviews of audits are performed after the release of the auditor ' s report are:
Internal inspection programs of audit fi rms, peer reviews of audit fi rms required by professional rules and state regulatory requirements, and PCAOB inspections all involve an assessment of audit effectiveness based on a review of audit documentation. These programs involve reviews by competent professionals of the audit documentation and interviews with engagement personnel intended to assess either the overall quality of the audit being reviewed (internal inspections and peer reviews) or of components of the audit (PCAOB reviews). Restatements, litigation, enforcement actions, discovery of fraud or other subsequent events, including business failure may provide indications that a specifi c audit may not have been effective at the date of the auditor ' s report.
Evaluating judgments based on later events
Hindsight does not necessarily provide evidence of the quality of a judgment made at the • • time of release of an audit report. A number of decisions involving fi nancial reporting involve estimates of future events. Estimates, even when made by persons with the relevant skills and experience and based on all reasonably available evidence at the time, will often prove to be different from the fi nal outcome of the matter being estimated, because of later changes in conditions. These differences do not constitute errors in judgment.
For example, auditing standards require that an auditor consider the ability of the entity being audited to continue as a ' going concern ' in the near future, generally one year. If that consideration indicates that there is substantial doubt regarding that ability to continue in operation, the auditor should report that conclusion. Experience and research show that many entities receive these going concern opinions but continue to operate as going concerns well after 1 year. This does not necessarily indicate an error in judgment because the entity has often taken steps to address the issues that created substantial doubt regarding its ability to continue in operation.
In addition, evaluations of audit judgments at a later date are more diffi cult to perform, because they must rely on documentation of audit work and the recollections of engagement team members at a later date. They are generally performed by persons who do not have the same level of knowledge of the specifi c audit engagement and that may differ in their views of materiality, their experience and their competency.
Information from inspections of audit engagements
Information generated from inspections is available to the fi rm subjected to the inspection and is an important part of an audit fi rm ' s monitoring process. However, this information is not generally available to the public, unless very severe defi ciencies identifi ed in these inspections require disciplinary action or, in the case of the PCAOB, public disclosure as required by SOX. The PCAOB does provide summary reports under its Rule 4010 of annual inspection fi ndings that are not specifi c to individual fi rms.
Information from alleged ' audit failures '
Restatements, litigation, enforcement actions, discovery of fraud or other subsequent events, including business failure may provide indications that a specifi c audit may not have been effective at the date of the auditor ' s report. When compared to the total number of audits performed annually, these events occur infrequently but are often highly public and tend to have signifi cant adverse effects. They do not provide evidence as to the effectiveness of audits for which no such events have occurred.
Restatements can be the result of the discovery of an error by a preparer in the normal course of business, discovery of a fraud, an industry-wide reinterpretation of an accounting standard, a PCAOB review or a change in SEC policy regarding correction of errors. Some of these causes of restatement would indicate a potential audit quality issue whereas others do not. Information as to the actual causal factors may not be disclosed in a manner that allows an assessment of the causes of the errors. The investigation of these events often leads to an investigation of other matters, at a substantially more stringent level of inquiry (lower materiality), resulting in the discovery of additional errors.
Litigation related to audits tends to be associated with disproportionate and large dollar value drops in market values. The litigation process applies complete, and biased, hindsight to assessments of audit quality. In addition, when litigation is settled before a jury decision, one requirement of the settlement will often be to seal all the information related to the case. Enforcement actions (SEC or PCAOB) tend to be selective and oriented towards situations involving losses or potential losses of market value that are signifi cant to the market as a whole or where there is identifi ed bad behavior. It could also be assumed that the decision to initiate enforcement actions is based on an informed belief that the actions will be successful.
THE MOST IMPORTANT AUDITOR JUDGMENT -THE AUDIT REPORT
The most important judgment made by an auditor related to a specifi c audit is the decision to either release a report on the fi nancial statements being audited or decline to do so. An audit is an iterative process that continues until suffi cient evidence is obtained to form a professional opinion on the fi nancial statements. Thus, the decision to report on the fi nancial statements involves a judgment that the evidence developed in the audit process supports the auditor ' s report and a judgment that there is no evidence is reasonably available, which has not been examined and might change the auditor ' s opinion.
The principal assertions contained in the standard unmodifi ed auditor ' s report in the United States are:
an assertion that the audit was conducted in accordance with the applicable auditing standards and that the audit provides a reasonable basis for the opinions expressed; an opinion that the fi nancial statements conform to the relevant fi nancial reporting standards; and an opinion that the fi nancial statements fairly present the fi nancial condition, results of operations and the cash fl ows of the entity.
This means that an effective audit is one that provides a reasonable basis to develop an opinion as to whether all material errors are identifi ed and properly addressed before the auditor ' s report is released. Auditing standards defi ne audit risk as ' … the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her opinion on fi nancial statements that are materially misstated ' .
• •
•

The nature of fi nancial statement misstatements
Financial statements can be misstated by either errors in recorded amounts or inaccurate or omitted disclosures. In addition, an auditor must be concerned with misstatements and whether they result from inadvertent mistakes or fraud. As a result, the requirements of the accounting framework being used by the preparer of the fi nancial statements are the primary determinants of what represents a misstatement. For example, when estimates of fair values are used in accounting for investments, the possibility that the ultimate amount realized differs from the amount recorded earlier would not necessarily indicate a misstatement. However, failure to disclose signifi cant estimating uncertainty related to a particular estimate, generally by compliance with the requirements of the related accounting standard, would represent a misstatement.
Judgments regarding materiality
Although audit effectiveness is defi ned in terms of detecting and appropriately responding to all material errors, the auditor ' s view of materiality directly affects the amount of effort required to achieve the required level of effectiveness. Materiality is defi ned by FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 in terms of the effects of a matter on ' … the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information … ' AU 312.10 states that the auditor ' s consideration of materiality requires professional judgment and ' … is infl uenced by his or her perception of the needs of a reasonable person who will rely on the fi nancial statements ' . It further states that judgments of materiality ' … necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative considerations ' .
Quantitative calculations of materiality
Current and proposed auditing standards require materiality to be defi ned quantitatively in planning an audit. Although all these standards admonish the auditor to consider all of the aspects of materiality in planning, experience has been that quantitative benchmarks are much more important in infl uencing the initial design of audit procedures, to evaluating the need for modifi cation of those procedures in response to audit fi ndings and for evaluating identifi ed errors. Further, because most auditors ' initial experience with materiality concepts involves calculating and using these single point quantitative measures, their training in these concepts may be delayed until later in their careers.
The application of the broad notion of materiality
It might be argued that the current quantitative model for audit planning materiality should be left undisturbed because it has been widely accepted. However, if the objective is to improve judgments, then the issue of improving the application of the total mix concept of materiality in planning an audit should be addressed.
Auditors should be aware of publicly available information relating to a client and, particularly of analysts ' reports. Planning documentation should include a discussion of the key variables discussed in these reports as being important for valuation. In cases in which the company ' s stock market valuation is primarily based on future expectations and not on historical performance (a ' story stock ' ), the plausibility of the story should be considered in decisions regarding acceptance or retention of the client and in evaluating disclosures and fairness of presentation. This review should be done by partners or managers and discussed in the risk meeting. Research may be able to help in increasing knowledge of how the total mix concept of materiality can be applied in practice before an audit is completed. In particular, does the assessment of materiality vary widely between audits? Variations between industries should be researched and key factors should be identifi ed.
• • • Most large fi rms have industry specialization programs that could be effective in developing concepts of materiality for specifi c industries. Developing concepts of disclosure error that could serve to improve the visibility of disclosures that are either missing or defi cient.
Constraints on the ability to achieve absolute assurance
Audit effectiveness must meet or exceed a threshold level of reasonable, not absolute, assurance 2 in order to meet professional and legal requirements. If this minimum level of assurance is not achieved, the auditor should modify or withhold any opinion. An absolute level of assurance is not achievable because of several natural constraints.
Preparers of fi nancial statements have primary responsibility for the fairness of those fi nancial statements. In accomplishing that task, they make judgments regarding the identification, interpretation and application of relevant accounting principles to transactions and events. The proper exercise of preparer judgment is a critical element of this risk. In addition, preparers are subject to time pressures created by the need to provide timely information to the market. Audits involve the use of selective testing. The nature of the audit procedures to be applied to items selected for testing, the number of items to be tested and the timing of those tests all infl uence the risk that signifi cant information will not be obtained and evaluated by the auditor. The evaluation and interpretation of audit evidence involve judgments that may vary or may prove incorrect. When preparers have purposefully misstated fi nancial statements for the purpose of hiding or perpetrating fraud, an auditor may not detect the fraud because of concealment through collusion, the withholding or falsifi cation of documents used in audit procedures or overriding of controls by management.
Auditing standards conclude that an auditor must place reliance on evidence that is persuasive, rather than convincing. All of these constraints are present in all audits but their relative impacts will vary widely from audit to audit and must be individually evaluated by an auditor.
Inter-relationship of audit effectiveness, materiality and reasonable assurance
In a manner similar to a confi dence statement in statistics, audit effectiveness can only be described in terms of a specifi c view of materiality. A given level of effectiveness is more easily achieved when judgments about materiality are less stringent than those situations in which those judgments are more stringent. In addition, the level of assurance that is reasonable may vary between audits because of the limitations discussed above.
The net result of these relationships is that audit effectiveness cannot be measured against an absolute value but must be assessed in the context of a specifi c view of materiality and level of reasonable assurance.
THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES ON RISK
As discussed above, the nature of accounting standards has a major effect on the risk of misstatement of fi nancial statements. An auditor ' s ability to audit an estimate is constrained by the inherent imprecision of the estimate and by the population of reasonably available evidence.
Increased discretion in accounting principles
Recent changes in accounting principles have been partially a result of a desire for greater relevance and for a reduction in the complexity and volume of rules involved in applying accounting principles. This shift to a more principles-based approach to accounting standards has led to standards that increasingly rely on the preparer to exercise judgment in applying those principles to specifi c cases and not to rely on the rules. Correspondingly, auditors will be called upon to exercise more judgment in evaluating the risk that fi nancial statements are misstated.
Substance over form
The nature and increased complexity of business operations has created much of the increased complexity in accounting principles. In particular, fi nancial engineering can substantially reduce the auditor ' s ability to evaluate the substance of transactions aside from their legal structure. The form (legal rights and obligations) of a fi nancial transaction may actually be the substance of the transaction. Further, the substance of a transaction may be dependent on counterparty or systemic risk characteristics that are not observable to the preparer of the fi nancial statements or the auditor.
Increased imprecision due to estimates of fair value
The estimate of current market prices (fair value) for certain assets that do not have a current market has created a substantial increase in the imprecision of amounts recognized in fi nancial statements and has increased the importance of disclosure of the nature of these estimates. These estimates substantially consist of the projection of future events that are often highly volatile.
These projections also require the development of probabilities of the possible outcomes of these events to be used in determining the amount to be recorded. Many models used in estimating fair values are based on an assumption that probabilities are normally distributed. The result of an assumption of normality is to severely underweigh potential events that would have very large economic consequences but are believed to be remote in terms of their likelihood of occurrence (in the ' tails ' of the distribution). Recent history involving mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives, shows that ' remote ' events can become less remote as market concentration and the related systemic risk increase. In cases where active markets do not exist, it is often difficult to observe the effects of this systemic risk. Accounting standards-setters clearly recognize that disclosures are important in describing the potential variability of estimates of fair value but have generally concentrated on disclosure of the more likely range. However, the disclosure of unlikely events with potentially signifi cant effects remains a very diffi cult issue that should be addressed, particularly where the preparer of the fi nancial statements may not be aware that counter-party risk has been increased systemically.
Effects on control risk
Changes in the nature of accounting principles have also placed greater stress on the importance of controls over the preparation of fi nancial statements. The preparer ' s systems and processes are based on professional judgments regarding the proper application of accounting principles, including the type and amount of evidence required to make that determination. Accounting principles that involve more discretion will place additional stress on these systems and procedures. For example, the application of fair value principles to investment securities requires a determination of whether an active market exists for the security. That determination may not have been a part of a preparer ' s systems and controls in the past. Now, preparers may be required to modify systems to monitor the status of markets or may use outside experts to perform that function.
THE STRUCTURE OF AN AUDIT FIRM AND QUALITY CONTROL
An audit fi rm is expected to have a system of quality control that provides reasonable assurance of compliance with professional standards in performing audits and a reasonable level of audit quality.
The decision to accept or retain a client
Given the consequences of association with a client that subsequently is revealed to have perpetrated a fraud, inadvertently issued materially misleading fi nancial statements or fails to accomplish its business model, perhaps an auditor ' s most important judgment is the decision to accept an engagement to perform an audit. This decision requires a high degree of judgment and has direct effects on commercial risk to the fi rm, to individual members of the fi rm and the business model of the fi rm. It can also infl uence the market ' s perceptions of an audit fi rm.
Processes that obtain, develop and use resources
Many of an audit fi rm ' s processes relate to supporting audit quality by obtaining the right resources, primarily personnel. These processes include activities related to recruiting, education, performance measurement, compensation and discipline; and developing audit methodologies, techno logies and processes that provide a basis for compliance with professional standards, identifi cation and appropriate reactions to changes in conditions that may affect audit quality and the effective performance of audits.
Processes that monitor engagement quality
Much of the information required to directly assess the effectiveness and effi ciency of an audit is contained in the audit working papers for that audit and is in unstructured text format. All audits involve highly subjective professional judgments that are based on both quantitative and qualitative considerations. As a result, the • • audit fi rms monitor engagement quality by means of internal inspection programs that include reviews of selected audit engagements and by required levels of review and consultation before the release of audit reports.
The accurate and consistent capture, compilation and analysis of engagement-level information by an audit fi rm would require substantial and expensive changes in procedures and systems. In addition, methods for capturing qualitative considerations in a form that would allow analysis would require signifi cant research and development cost.
Processes that are applied at the engagement level
Most audit fi rms ' organizational structures recognize that individual audits are the focus of controls over audit quality by emphasizing oversight and monitoring activities that are primarily located at or near the engagement level. Both auditing and quality control standards place heavy reliance on supervision and review of the work performed by all members of the engagement team, consultation with qualifi ed experts and specialists and concurring partner review. Auditing standards now place heavy emphasis on the completeness and quality of documentation and create a presumption that undocumented work was not performed.
Impact of PCAOB inspections on audit fi rm processes
In addition to reviews of selected audit engagements, PCAOB inspections include reviews of aspects of an audit fi rm ' s operations that are performed above the engagement level (functional reviews). Many of these functions were the subject of peer reviews and of the fi rms ' internal inspection programs before PCAOB inspections. However, there are two areas that were not covered by earlier inspection activities that have had substantial impact on audit fi rm behavior. Specifi cally:
The PCAOB reviews the methods used by a fi rm to communicate and enforce the ' tone at the top ' as it relates to audit quality.
• The PCAOB reviews the processes used by a fi rm to monitor partner performance and to allocate partner earnings. The objective of this review is to determine how audit quality is assessed and factored into partner compensation. This is signifi cant because, for the fi rst time, an audit fi rm ' s business model is included as a consideration in assessing an audit fi rm ' s quality of practice. In addition, the early results of these reviews brought to light the diffi culties involved in measuring audit quality in connection with performance evaluations.
Effects of clientele and external factors on the fi rm ' s business model
The business model adopted by different audit fi rms is directly infl uenced by the characteristics of their current clientele and the clientele they wish to attract or retain. The mix of risk represented by each fi rm ' s client list varies in terms of both the risks of association with the client and the client ' s risk of producing fi nancial statements that contain material errors. In addition, the ability of an audit fi rm to attract new clientele is partly a function of relevant experience gained from its current clientele.
One driver of the consolidation and growth of large audit fi rms has been the consolidation of public companies into fewer, larger and more global entities. This trend placed greater emphasis on having in place effective global networks, personnel capabilities, technology and specialty skills as a prerequisite for being hired and retained by these large entities.
These business models also change over time as a result of changes in the fi rm ' s external environment. For example, because of the pressures on resources created by Section 404 of SOX, some fi rms adopted forms of dismissal for clients that did not meet certain criteria related to readiness for compliance with SOX. As the amount of 404 work has decreased, there are indications that these fi rms are again competing for clients.
• Although large fi rms have generally resisted differentiation of public company audit and non-public work, this might change if the standards continue to diverge. In the United States, the differences in litigation exposure and regulatory oversight may cause this to change.
Impact of the business model on audit quality
Although the focus of auditor judgment continues to be on the activities of the engagement team and the various other aspects of monitoring of quality, the business model of a fi rm must also be considered as a major infl uence on the exercise of auditor judgment.
Although audit quality may be the primary goal of an audit fi rm ' s quality controls, the fact that these fi rms must earn a return and allocate it to partners in a manner that compensates partners with the appropriate expertise, intelligence and motivation to remain with the fi rm and encourages partners without those qualities to either improve or leave the fi rm means that developing performance criteria and income allocation methods that properly emphasize quality requires careful study. The audit component of an accounting fi rm has a litigation risk profi le (potential magnitude and causality) and imposes independent requirements that are substantially different from other areas of practice. An audit fi rm ' s ability to attract and retain the appropriate level of talent (experienced and inexperienced) is heavily infl uenced by the level and intensity of competition for these personnel with other audit fi rms, other fi rms that hire from the same sources and, in some cases, other areas of practice within its own entity. Competitive pressure on prices or reduction in the total level of available work creates incentive to reduce the level of audit effort in order to compete on the basis of audit cost. The pressure to earn a profi t results in 
APPRENTICESHIP, PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM AND THE COMPETENCY OF AUDITORS
In addition to a knowledge of accounting, the necessary competencies of an auditor consist of an understanding of business and an understanding of materiality; an auditor must have the attitudes and attributes of independence, integrity and professional skepticism.
The ability to develop proper audit judgments is developed and maintained by the audit fi rms through an apprenticeship model, which is heavily dependent on the teaching of earlier experience. This model is an effective and effi cient approach to develop inexperienced personnel but is susceptible to problems when conditions change. For example, the rapid computerization of business in the 1960s, increased complexity in fi nancial products and the recent trend towards the use of fair values have all presented challenges for auditors that have, in general, been addressed by the use of specialists.
Although inexperienced auditors are typically hired based on the determination that they have had suffi cient education and demonstrated ability in academics, they generally lack any real experience in making the judgments required to complete an audit properly. Audit fi rms compensate for this defi ciency by a combination of policies and processes that include mentoring, formal training, and supervised on-the-job experience. New staff members are not assigned to tasks that require a high level of experience and judgment. However, over time, progression in an audit fi rm is based on demonstrated competency in auditing. Although all auditors must be skilled accountants, audit competencies extend beyond accounting knowledge and include knowledge of business, knowledge of evidence and risk assessment, and an understanding of materiality.
A natural tendency as auditors gain experience is for them to rely heavily on their earlier experience in making judgments. This is a proper and useful approach but suffers from the risk that the auditor will encounter situations that are not comparable to earlier experience or that the auditor will not observe a change in conditions that affects audit risk. Although competent professionals take responsibility for their own continuing education, the processes and procedures of an audit fi rm must include provisions for keeping personnel informed of new developments, particularly changes in conditions that may affect audit judgments.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The judgments made by auditors in performing individual audits of fi nancial statements are signifi cantly infl uenced by factors that are external to those audits. This external environment includes the effects of the actions of regulatory bodies and the processes and policies and business model of the auditor ' s fi rm. General economic and industry conditions and the accounting principles used in preparing fi nancial statements are also important components of the external environment. This environment has changed substantially and will continue to do so in the future.
The quality of auditor judgments and the resulting quality of audits has become a topic of increased scrutiny by parties outside the auditing profession. These parties (investors, analysts, regulators and public interest groups) will continue to exercise greater infl uence on the activities of auditors. Auditing standards related to audits of public companies in the United States will continue to be rulebased standards enforced through inspections and enforcement activities. This regulatory approach will place greater emphasis on the ability of regulators to develop standards that can be demonstrated to be effective • and capable of reasonable implementation in practice. Business conditions affect audit fi rms and audit engagements through their effects on clients and on the business models of the audit fi rms. These conditions have shown a high degree of uncertainty and will continue to do so in the future. This will require that auditors become better at anticipating changes in the external environment and their effects on audit risk. Accounting principles will continue to evolve generally toward less specifi city and greater use of estimates requiring predictions of future events that are fraught with difficulty. This trend will continue to increase the importance of judgments made by preparers of fi nancial statements. The resulting increase in the inherent uncertainty in recorded amounts will increase the need for both meaningful disclosure requirements in accounting standards and for a better framework for identifying situations in which additional disclosure may be appropriate.
The pressure to measure and report audit quality will not decrease and should be addressed. Auditors should be actively involved, along with others, in the development of reasonable approaches to satisfy the desire for indicators of quality. Regulators should develop a useful defi nition of audit quality to provide a basis for evaluating quality in a regulatory framework. Research into the means used by audit committees may be useful in furthering this objective. Techniques should be developed, that allow the capture of qualitative data related to audit engagements in a manner that would prevent quantitative measurements overpowering qualitative considerations. Finally, any measures of audit quality must be developed with an understanding that audit quality is ultimately only meaningful in the context of a specifi c audit.
An audit fi rm ' s structure, process and procedures, and business model are partly determined by its external environment and the fi rm must • • monitor and react to changes in that environment. In addition, an audit fi rm can infl uence or control many aspects of its internal processes that may allow improvements in the quality of auditor judgments and audit quality. Many audit fi rms are engaged in activities that are intended to improve these processes.
There is an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of monitoring audit quality and of improving audit methodologies by capturing engagement level data in a manner that would allow analysis of audit characteristics and results. This will require research and signifi cant investment. Audit fi rms should consider development of systematic processes to obtain and assess external information related to companies, industries and external conditions for their effects on audit risk.
• • The good news is that the audit process and auditor judgment are an important topic outside the profession. Although perhaps less comfortable to practicing auditors, I believe this outside interest will prove to be a useful incentive to continue to improve the exercise of auditor judgment and, thereby, the quality of audits of fi nancial statements. 
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